IntroductionVI
Upgrading the industrial structure as well as the corresponding improvement
in infrastructure, however, entails coordination of investments and
compensation for externalities generated by fi rst movers that cannot be
internalized by private enterprises. Without this coordination and compensation,
the process of economic development will slow. The government
should therefore play an active role in facilitating structural change
through mitigating the coordination and externality problem.
Chapter I reviews the evolution of development thinking and presents
the main arguments and extensions of New Structural Economics. This
chapter also includes insightful comments on the framework from my colleagues
Anne Krueger, Dani Rodrik, and Joseph Stiglitz and my rejoinder
to their comments.
Chapter II shows how the New Structural Economics complements previous
thinking on development and growth. It compares the predictions
derived from the New Structural Economics with the stylized facts of successful
countries identifi ed by the Growth Report issued in 2008 by the
Commission on Growth and Development and discusses the policy lessons
that can be drawn from the New Structural Economics. The principle of
comparative advantage and the role of the state in facilitating structural
transformation, which are key aspects of the framework, are further discussed
in a subsequent debate between Ha-Joon Chang and myself.
The Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation framework (GIFF), which
lays out a step-by-step approach for policy makers to facilitate structural
change based on the framework of the New Structural Economics, is
presented in chapter III. It guides policy makers on how to identify new
industries consistent with a country’s latent comparative advantage. It
also presents information, coordination, and externality issues intrinsic
to industrial upgrading and discusses government policies that can help
overcome these constraints. Explaining why industrial policy has often
failed in the past, the chapter also warns against government policies that
are aimed at protecting selected fi rms and industries that defy a country’s
comparative advantage. Dirk Willem te Velde, Suresh Tendulkar,
Alice Amsen, K. Y. Amoako, Howard Pack, and Wonhyuk Lim provide
thought-provoking comments on the approach. The chapter concludes
with a rejoinder.
Economic development is a process of continuous technological innovation and structural transformation. Development thinking is inherently tied to the quest for sustainable growth strategies. This book provides a neoclassical approach for studying the determinants of economic structure and its transformation and draws new insights for development policy. The market is the basic mechanism for effective resource allocation at each level of development. However, economic development as a dynamic process entails structural changes, including industrial upgrading and diversification and corresponding improvements in hard and soft infrastructure. Such upgrading and improvements require coordination and go hand in hand with large externalities to firms transaction costs and returns to capital investment. Thus, in addition to an effective market mechanism, the government should play an active role in facilitating structural changes. The book provides empirical evidence in support of this framework as well as concrete advice to development practitioners.
in infrastructure, however, entails coordination of investments and
compensation for externalities generated by fi rst movers that cannot be
internalized by private enterprises. Without this coordination and compensation,
the process of economic development will slow. The government
should therefore play an active role in facilitating structural change
through mitigating the coordination and externality problem.
Chapter I reviews the evolution of development thinking and presents
the main arguments and extensions of New Structural Economics. This
chapter also includes insightful comments on the fr
Anne Krueger, Dani Rodrik, and Joseph Stiglitz and my rejoinder
to their comments.
Chapter II shows how the New Structural Economics complements previous
thinking on development and growth. It compares the predictions
derived from the New Structural Economics with the stylized facts of successful
countries identifi ed by the Growth Report issued in 2008 by the
Commission on Growth and Development and discusses the policy lessons
that can be drawn from the New Structural Economics. The principle of
comparative advantage and the role of the state in facilitating structural
transformation, which are key aspects of the fr
in a subsequent debate between Ha-Joon Chang and myself.
The Growth Identifi cation and Facilitation fr
lays out a step-by-step approach for policy makers to facilitate structural
change ba
presented in chapter III. It guides policy makers on how to identify new
industries consistent with a country’s latent comparative advantage. It
also presents information, coordination, and externality issues intrinsic
to industrial upgrading and discusses government policies that can help
overcome these constraints. Explaining why industrial policy has often
failed in the past, the chapter also warns against government policies that
are aimed at protecting selected fi rms and industries that defy a country’s
comparative advantage. Dirk Willem te Velde, Suresh Tendulkar,
Alice Amsen, K. Y. Amoako, Howard Pack, and Wonhyuk Lim provide
thought-provoking comments on the approach. The chapter concludes
with a rejoinder.
本文摘自《新结构经济学》
Economic development is a process of continuous technological innovation and structural transformation. Development thinking is inherently tied to the quest for sustainable growth strategies. This book provides a neoclassical approach for studying the determinants of economic structure and its transformation and draws new insights for development policy. The market is the basic mechanism for effective resource allocation at each level of development. However, economic development as a dynamic process entails structural changes, including industrial upgrading and diversification and corresponding improvements in hard and soft infrastructure. Such upgrading and improvements require coordination and go hand in hand with large externalities to firms transaction costs and returns to capital investment. Thus, in addition to an effective market mechanism, the government should play an active role in facilitating structural changes. The book provides empirical evidence in support of this fr