现在人们对中国的讨论中充满了悲观情绪。自从去年八月的股市崩盘和今年第一季度不尽人意的经济增长速度出现之后，人们现在习惯于对中国市场持看跌态度。最近，消极情绪又集中到了中国的债务水平、经济增长放缓和改革进度缓慢上。
但是我们有不能放弃中国市场的很好原因。
中国的债务水平是个问题但是还没达到即将发生危机的水平。
彭博社的数据显示中国有很高的债务水平，比那些曾经经历债务危机的新兴市场的债务水平都要高得多。但是这个债务水平还远低于危机水平，因为中国目前的债务性质不同。
首先，要考虑谁持有债务。在1994年墨西哥债务危机、1997年亚洲债务危机和2002年巴西危机期间，外国投资者是主要获利者。相反，瑞士联合银行的数据显示中国90%的债务都是国内持有。
其次，过去的危机都伴随着货币贬值和国外资本撤回。在我看来，中国货币贬值的可能性很低。所以现在更重要的是中国投资者对债务危机的看法。讽刺的是中国的债务增长与中国公民有限投资选择相关，他们仅能进行储蓄或者投资债务。企业一直是大规模借款人，他们乐于发行债券向中国投资者支付利息。中国企业的债务水平从2007年GDP的102%增长到2015年GDP的165%。
国民储蓄率能很好的平衡债务水平，一些人认为中国的储蓄与债务水平相符。这一观点的例子：中国的储蓄率已经持续居高几十年，在过去20年中平均的储蓄率为GDP的45%。
中国经济仍然具备增长潜力，仅仅是没达到两位数
最近中国GDP从1980年到2010平均10%的增长速度下降到低于7%使一些人认为即将面临中等收入陷阱并且即将出现危险的增长速度下降势头。很多人都有这种担心。中国实际的人均GDP是8100美元，而美国是56000美元，日本是33000美元，新兴市场平均为10600美元。而且有过新兴市场成功逃离中等收入陷阱的例子。
中国很可能将会受益于其庞大的人口基数。创造经济增长不仅仅是创造就业，还需要有效的分配这些人力资源。户口制度的放松意味着人们可以从乡村搬到经济增长更加有活力的城市。这个仍然在进行中的迁徙过程很可能将会促进未来中国经济的增长。世界银行的数据显示，2014年末中国城镇人口的比例为54%，而美国为81%，墨西哥为79%。最后，取消独生子女政策将会增加家庭消费并减缓中国日益恶化的人口老龄化趋势。
政策制定者意识到了需要做什么
中国需要进行改革以支撑其长期的经济增长潜力。目标是把经济过度到一个基于消费而不是投资的更加稳定的环境中。 正如我们之前指出的，虽然因为周期性压力最近的改革速度正在放缓，已经实现的改革还是对经济增长有支撑作用的。其中包括国有企业的私有化和结构改革，例如上面提到的放宽户口制度和独生子女政策。
尽管我们最近采取用了一个对中国更加有利的观点，但是我们还是认识到了对中国经济增长的不利因素。过高的债务水平和过度的产能仍然是中国长期经济增长的主要风险。如果债务问题得不到处理并继续高速增长将会产生问题。
但是在其经济增长曾经遇到诸多问题时，中国之前已经证明了怀疑者们是错误的。我们的总结是现在不要放弃中国经济和中国企业，但是要做好中国经济进入新篇章时出现波动的准备。
3 Reasons Not to Give Up on China (yet)
By Blackrock Author | May 30, 2016
Strong pessimism has become the norm when conversations gravitate to China. Ever since last August’s domestic stock market crash and disappointing first-quarter economic growth, being a China bear seems to have become more popular. Most recently, negative sentiment has focused on China’s debt level, slowing growth and sluggish implementation of reforms.
But there are good reasons not to give up on China just yet.
China’s debt level is a problem but not at an imminent debt-crisis level.
China certainly has a high absolute level of debt, with levels much higher than those seen in other emerging market (EM) countries who experienced debt crises, according to Bloomberg data. But an imminent debt crisis seems unlikely, due to the different nature of China’s current debt.
First, consider who owns the debt. During the Mexico debt crisis in 1994, the Asian debt crisis in 1997 or the Brazil crisis in 2002, foreign investors were the dominant stakeholder. In contrast, according to UBS, more than 90 percent of Chinese debt is currently domestically owned.
Second, past crises centered around currency devaluations and foreign money flowing out. The potential for a Chinese currency devaluation is low, in our opinion. So, now it’s more about how Chinese investors feel about the debt issue. The irony is that the growth of Chinese debt is related to Chinese citizens’ limited set of investment options: invest in debt or save (as capital controls restrict money from flowing out of the country). The corporate sector has been a large borrower, happy to issue debt to provide interest to the Chinese investor. Corporate debt grew from 102 percent of Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 to 165 percent by 2015, as the chart below shows.
The national savings rate may in fact justify the high debt level, as some have argued, with Chinese savings matched to debt issuance. Case in point: China’s gross savings rate has been high for decades, averaging around 45 percent of GDP for the last 20 years, per the World Bank.
The Chinese economy still has the potential to grow, just not at double-digit rates.
The recent decline in China’s GDP to below 7 percent from an average of 10 percent from 1980 to 2010 has some worried that the country is on the verge of hitting the middle-income trap, and a dangerous downward growth streak is ahead. The numbers contest this worry. China’s real GDP per capita (person) is $8,100, compared with $56,000 in the U.S., $33,000 in Japan and an EM average of $10,600. Furthermore, there have been instances where EM countries have managed to escape the middle-income trap.
China is also likely to benefit from its 1.2 billion population. Creating economic growth will not only be about bringing people into the labor force, but it’ll also be about how to allocate those human resources efficiently. The relaxation of the Hukou system means people can move from rural areas to cities where economic growth is vibrant. This relocation process, still in progress, is likely to support growth going forward. According to the World Bank, China’s urban population was 54 percent at the end of 2014 versus 81 percent in the U.S. and 79 percent in Mexico. Lastly, the elimination of the one-child policy has the potential to boost household consumption in the short term and to slow China’s worsening demographic picture over the longer run.
Policymakers recognize what needs to be done.
Reforms need to be implemented to support the country’s long-term growth potential. The goal is to transition the economy to a more sustainable and stable path based around consumption rather than investment. And, as I’ve written before, though the pace of reform has slowed lately due to cyclical pressures, the reforms that have been implemented are ones that are supportive to growth. These include the privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and structural reforms, like the relaxing of the Hukou system and the one-child policy mentioned above.
Though we have adopted a more favorable view of China lately, we are cognizant of headwinds to Chinese growth. Excessive leverage and overcapacity remain major risks for the country’s long-term growth prospects. Debt levels that are left unmanaged and allowed to grow exponentially would create problems.
But China has proved the skeptics wrong before, experiencing many bumps along its road to economic power. Bottom line: Don’t give up on the Chinese economy and Chinese equities just yet, but be prepared for market volatility as China’s new chapter is written.